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Helmut Knochen, telegraphed the section head in charge in the Reich Security Main Office Reichssicherheitshauptamt, or RSHA , Adolf Eichmann, on 25 September Around ,, or 75 percent, of the , Jews registered in France in the fall of and in the summer of survived the German occupation.

The number of victims as a percentage of the Jewish population was relatively low,2 but 80, people nevertheless fell victim to the persecution.

They were thrown at the mercy of the German perpetrators by the Vichy government and its authorities or, especially in the final year of the occupation, were captured by the German special task forces and removed from their hideouts.

Between March and August , some 77, Jews were deported to Auschwitz and other extermination and concentration camps, where they were murdered in the gas chambers or perished through slave labor, starvation, and daily violence.

Between 3, and 4, Jews perished in the detention camps on French soil. The persistent decline in the numbers of deportees in France from September onward is clearly discernible.

It was a result of considerations of political expediency on the part of the SS, which relinquished the immediate implementation of the deportation plan developed by Adolf Eichmann after the French head of government, Pierre Laval, had drawn their attention to the protest of high-level church dignitaries and the negative domestic political impact of the deportations.

Around 77,, or 24 percent, of the Jews resident in France in would nevertheless be deported to Auschwitz, where virtually all of them were murdered in the gas chambers or perished as a result of forced labor, hunger, and violence.

In the Netherlands, by contrast, the deportation rate was 73 percent , of , Copyright Wolfgang Seibel. The present study has two objectives.

First, it attempts to explain why the very same actors who radicalized the persecution of the Jews a short time later went on to contain it.

The central thesis of the study is that the dynamic of the mass crime committed against the Jews under the German occupation in France from to was steered by the ambivalence of the power-sharing arrangement and that the radicalization or containment of the persecution depended on whether the key actors on the German and French sides who were competing for shares in power were forced to include the effect of moral norms in their calculations, even though they did not share these norms themselves.

Second, the study is concerned with the conclusions to be drawn from this finding. The primary factor was the logic of reciprocity in negotiation systems, the willingness to accept immoral bargains, and the limits to which such bargains are subject.

The assumptions are based on both empirical evidence and theoretical considerations. The SS, the central agency of the persecution and terror, was initially merely one of these rivaling authorities.

But its influence increased continually from the beginning of the war onward, and its leadership left no doubt that it regarded itself as the decisive power elite in a Europe under German hegemony.

From the summer of , the SS first had to struggle to achieve the position of power in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands that it had already achieved in the Reich and in the Polish territories occupied since September The persecution of the Jews served as an important means in this power struggle in which the SS leadership sought to reconcile the political goal of relative dominance with the organizational goal of an effective administration of the persecution.

For this reason, conventional notions concerning the role played by bureaucracy in planning and realizing the persecution and extermination of the Jews need to be relativized.

Weberian concepts of bureaucracy as the backbone of a totalitarian machinery of state and as a smoothly functioning tool of a political leadership, such as those underlying earlier studies on the role of the administration in the Holocaust,6 tend to be misleading.

Closer to the reality of the National Socialist terror apparatus are contributions to the theory of bureaucracy that emphasize the competition for power and influence within and between administrative bodies7 and that do not neglect the network-like structures of the persecution apparatus.

This dependence was especially acute in the case of France because of the strategic importance of the country for the German conduct of the war.

In so doing, he overruled more far-reaching demands by Italy that would have adversely affected France.

It also jealously guarded its competences in its own occupied zone in southeastern France. In and , this would save the lives of tens of thousands of Jews who would otherwise have been arrested and deported by the French police under the collaboration agreements with the Germans.

Hitler, as he reiterated in his Directive No. This was especially true in the pivotal domain of the police, control over which was, from the German point of view, decisive for implementing the persecution measures against the Jews.

Researchers who have studied the political and administrative relations between the Germans and the French with regard to the persecution of the Jews have mainly depicted the German and French measures as being either mutually complementary or a product of direct collaboration.

Michael Mayer, in his comparative study of the roles played by the German and French ministerial bureaucracies in drafting the anti-Jewish legislation, points to the fact that the German occupying power in France was fundamentally unable to permanently cross the threshold separating segregation policy from extermination policy, because of its dependence on the French administration and police.

Its basic premise is that the powersharing arrangement between the German and French authorities gave rise to diverse forms of interaction that, in turn, had ambivalent effects on the persecution of the Jews.

The two quotations at the beginning of this introduction allude to this ambivalence. The conventional assumption formulated by Rudolph J.

Power sharing, not the monopolization of power, shaped the relations between the occupying power and the domestic authorities in this area as well.

Sometimes, the dynamic of power sharing had the effect of unleashing persecution; at other times, the absence of a German monopoly on power had the effect of containing persecution.

However, this situation in particular extended the range of practical options open to the French side. The political bargain on which the German-French agreements rested continued to include inducements for the Vichy government to cooperate in the mass arrests and deportations of the Jews, but it simultaneously included a de facto veto option.

Vichy exercised its veto option when the involvement in the mass arrests and deportations became too costly in domestic and foreign political terms.

Playing an important role instead were the relevant modes of interaction between the two sides, according to whether it placed emphasis more on rivalry or on cooperation, and the associated political cost-benefit calculation on the Vichy side.

The result of this calculation and hence the question of the expediency of the collaboration with Germany in the domain of the persecution of the Jews acquired increased importance in the stable form of state collaboration than under the unstable conditions of unclarified questions of competence and mutual rivalry.

The classification itself goes back to Raul Hilberg25 and still fulfills an important heuristic function. But it necessarily neglects the complex political and organizational conditions governing an occupying regime in which the persecution of the Jews was embedded and therefore also the constantly changing and internally contradictory configurations of the key actors and their logics of action.

Laub, in his study of the German occupation regime in France between and , analyzed the multifaceted tactical twists in occupation policy and the internal tensions and conflicts of the German occupation administration, the authorities in Berlin to which it reported, and the numerous satellite organizations in occupied France.

But they later adopted a passive stance on the implementation of the deportation and marginalized the radical antiSemites within their own government apparatus.

Mixed Motivations and the Mobilization and Demobilization of Coperpetrators The third and most important premise on which the approach of this book is based concerns the rationality governing the actions of those involved.

This issue has prompted a sometimes heated debate. The logic of political utilitarianism that spurred collaboration also operated in the opposite direction once the circumstances changed.

Nevertheless, both partners, Laval and the SS, had an alert cynical appreciation of the moral norms that shaped not only the conduct of the church dignitaries but also, in particular, the behavior of the population and the response of public opinion.

This does not mean, however, that their conduct was erratic or that the rationalities governing their conduct were themselves arbitrary.

Once this plan had been adopted, the radical persecution of the Jews, including their physical elimination from mainstream society, was a fixed political goal for all of those directly or indirectly involved, independent of their own attitude, and was an operational administrative plan since the Wannsee Conference of 20 January The momentum and vehemence of the persecution of the Jews was a result of the fact that one did not need to be either a Nazi or an anti-Semite in order to participate in the persecution.

On closer inspection, this diagnosis is far more disturbing than the notion that the perpetrators and their helpers had to have had murderous motives.

If the boundaries between the perpetrators and their accomplices were fluid, perpetrators and accomplices could be indistinguishable when it came to the banality of their motives.

This normality was much more terrifying than all the atrocities put together. Opportunism or compatible interests often sufficed.

In essence, however, the banality and opportunism of coperpetrator motives is at once disturbing and reassuring. Unlike ideological zeal, opportunism is based on implicit calculation.

Once circumstances change, coperpetrator mobilization may falter as quickly as it was unleashed. To overemphasize anti-Semitism as a motivational factor in the implementation of the Holocaust would be not only to underestimate the potential for mass crime in the midst of society but also to ignore the potential for intervention and neutralization.

It is virtually impossible to change the mind-sets of zealous perpetrators, but it is possible to influence the opportunistic calculations of their accomplices.

What makes planned, organized mass criminality especially murderous is the institutionalization of diverse practical inducements.

It leads to the extensive mobilization of accomplices at the periphery through the mobilization of the many partial rationalities governing the actions of various authorities and administrative branches and their numerous personnel for the centrally planned persecution and extermination process.

Whether one participated in the collective crime or not remained, as Arendt observed, an individual decision and a question of individual responsibility.

The leading representatives of the Nazi regime themselves assumed that the moral exclusion of Jews remained fragile, and they went to great lengths to continually reignite anti-Semitism among the wider population and among the intellectuals.

The leadership of the regime was well aware that the division of labor among the authorities involved and their complexity as such could not really conceal the crime.

This is why the mass murder was consistently kept secret and why euphemisms were used even in internal communication between bureaus. By contrast, men like the cardinal and archbishop of Lyon, Pierre-Marie Gerlier, had nothing to lose by following their conscience and appealing to both the moral and the patriotic feelings of their fellow countrymen in the protest against the deportations of the Jews.

However, the moral core of these appeals was entirely free of utilitarian considerations. They are as much our brothers as the others. This developed into the decisive barrier against the unlimited exploitation of the power-sharing arrangement between the occupying power and the representatives of the occupied country for the purposes of the persecution.

In this respect, the French case is a prime example of the mobilization and demobilization of accessories who help to launch a mass crime without intending to do so and who impede it even though they do not want to prevent it.

Research Design and Method: Identifying Causal Mechanisms and Critical Junctures, Establishing General Inferences In terms of theory and method, this study is a political science analysis of state-sponsored mass crime, informed by social science concepts of causality linking human action to structural conditions.

This leads to the question of how and to what extent the occupiers managed to exploit the power-sharing arrangement with the representatives of the occupied country for the persecution of the Jews.

The related question is where the limits of this exploitation lay and how they arose. The objective is neither the examination of covariances using a large number of cases nor the examination of single influential variables; it is, instead, theory-driven process tracing based on a single case.

Yet the SS tried, before and after the agreements with their French opposite numbers, to arrest and deport the Jews wherever possible, and thousands of Jews, in particular children, were taken in and rescued by French people.

Their behavioral patterns were shaped by individual key actors to whom the responsibility for actions and omissions can and must be ascribed.

The key players acted within an ideological and institutional context that constituted opportunities and constraints that, in turn, entailed the very causal mechanisms through which behavioral patterns were transformed into actual decisions.

We usually take for granted that the decisions of key actors were aggregated to produce a final outcome through legal and organizational implementation, although we find significant exceptions in the Italian occupation zone in southeastern France from November through September Opportunities and constraints changed over the course of time, as did the positions and practical dispositions of the key players.

Moreover, the attachment of the church to Vichy is the reason why this intervention was so effective. Clearly, therefore, structures, positions, and action strategies intermeshed in a partly counterintuitive way.

Graphic depiction of causal mechanisms. The drawback of a single case study is supposedly the lack of a test of external validity, or, to put it another way, the absence of generalizability.

This objection only applies to variable-based research in social science, however, against which it is also aimed in the relevant textbooks.

Here, too, the deportations were initiated in close collaboration with the home administration and police, only to be brought to an abrupt halt by the government; here, too, the moratorium was brought about by political pressure, specifically that of the United States and a number of neutral countries.

Without cooperation, certain problems cannot be solved. But at the same time, the occupying power will be concerned at least to defend its power advantage, whereas the representatives of the occupied country will be concerned to extend their power.

Therefore, they are predictable and hence generalizable. The same holds for bargaining, the basic mechanism that integrates rivalry and cooperation.

Bargaining is also predictable and hence generalizable, as is compromise formation based on this mechanism. Bargaining partners take their orientation both from what is acceptable as regards solving problems and from what is acceptable as regards their mutual power relations.

From the perspective of causal analysis, this is, at the same time, the essential causal mechanism linking causal factors with their effects. The representatives of an occupying power and the representatives of an occupied country compete over a specific spectrum of key resources, but the outcome of this competitive relation cannot be predicted in advance.

Among the key resources are raw materials and productive resources and control over manpower, infrastructure, administrative apparatuses, legislative competences, and law enforcement agencies.

This situation was no different in the relations between German and French authorities in the years of the occupation.

Because it was in possession of the manpower and the law enforcement agents and because the German dictator, out of military and geopolitical considerations, permitted it a government of its own, with its own legislative and administrative authority and its own armed forces in North Africa and the overseas territories, the French side had a comparatively strong starting position in the bargaining processes that were a feature of the everyday relations with the occupying power.

The representatives of the occupied country could also impose their will in particular instances against a reluctant occupying power.

They naturally sought to extend these opportunities, just as the German occupiers sought to restrict them to what was unavoidable. However, the power rationality of the French side differed in one important point from that of the German side.

For the French side, the support of its own population and of societal groups was also an important factor. But it was even possible to capitalize on this in negotiations with the occupying power.

Demands for material or symbolic improvements that strengthened domestic support could be brought to bear in return for concessions that benefited the occupiers.

Conversely, precisely such concessions could occasionally be avoided by appealing to their domestic political costs. These limitations of the assumptions concerning the characteristics of an occupying regime and the action orientations of its key players lead to the second methodological feature of this study, the specific character of causal process tracing.

A historical explanation does not rest on unfocused narratives. It is concerned with turning points and critical junctures and with identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for those decisions that render these turning points and junctures identifiable as such.

Causal mechanisms, as such, are undirected,92 and the statements by Rudolph J. Rummel and James Buchanan quoted at the beginning of this introduction acquaint us with the ambivalent effects of power sharing and bargaining.

The effects could consist just as well in the intensification as in the containment of the persecution, and apparently both situations were the case in France.

Therefore, this study leads to the further question posed by Benjamin Valentino: exactly what leads one and the same causal mechanism to unleash mass crime in one case and to impede it in another?

Organization of the Book The account of the development of and interconnections between these practical rationalities and the decisions guided by them follows the key sequences of the events that were decisive for the fate of the Jews in occupied France.

This involves four phases. During the first phase, the SS and hence the core group of the perpetrators prevailed in the power struggle with the Wehrmacht.

The second phase marked the consolidation of the increase in power of the SS. This was the result of an arrangement with the government in Vichy.

It was based on a compromise that epitomized the logic of collaboration in the area of policing. These accords were sealed with the so-called Oberg-Bousquet agreement of 8 August , which marks the conclusion of this phase.

The protest of the two Christian churches spread once deportations began from provincial regions of the unoccupied zone as well, as was envisaged by the Oberg-Bousquet agreement.

With the protest of the church, one of the domestic political pillars of Vichy, the persecution of the Jews suddenly became a matter of regime cohesion.

The fourth and longest phase was marked by the further distancing of the government in Vichy from the collaboration with the German occupying power in the persecution of the Jews.

They took care, as far as was possible, of the business of the Germans when it came to the persecution of the Jews. The last deportation trains left France in August By this time, the system of state collaboration at all levels and the smoothly functioning exploitation of the French police for the persecution of the Jews were already things of the past.

But the Germans had planned it, and without the presence of the German Wehrmacht it would never have materialized. Moreover, it would be pointless to ignore the particular lessons to be learned from that interaction.

The present analysis reveals how power and morality were interlinked in the developing relations between perpetrators and collaborators and how morally indifferent collaborators and even ruthless perpetrators could be forced to acknowledge the power of morality once the latter gained momentum both in circles close to the regime and in public opinion.

Also of importance was the extended preparatory phase of the military strategy in Western Europe. This preparation, also as regards the occupation administration, was largely under the control of the Wehrmacht.

In this regard, the latter worked closely with experts of the civilian Reich administration. The main purpose was to mobilize the economic power of the occupied territories for German purposes.

Although the Wehrmacht also exercised administrative functions in the rear military areas in the war against the Soviet Union in Serbia, Greece, and North Africa , it did so there under completely different conditions of an occupation situation defined primarily in military terms.

Both the influence exerted by Himmler on appointments to the upper echelons of the administration in the Netherlands and his repeated attempts to have a civil administration with an HSSPF established in Belgium indicate that he was well aware of the relative weakness of his position.

The persecution of the Jews in Western Europe from to followed the pattern of institution building and progressive escalation established in Germany proper, in Austria, and in the Nazi-established Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

These measures were followed by deportation and extermination. This was due, in the first instance, to the internal contradictions of German policy toward the countries concerned.

These contradictions not only brought to light conflicts between the German actors but also broadened the scope for action of the domestic actors.

Both factors had ambivalent repercussions for the persecution of the Jews. The supposition that the power enjoyed by the SS and police apparatus in particular had profound repercussions for the persecution of the Jews is trivial.

It is indeed evident that the initial position created by the respective occupation regimes for the SS and Gestapo to enforce the persecution measures, at least in the area of police repression, was of supreme importance.

Under these conditions, a vertical and a horizontal axis of power sharing emerged. If the aim was to husband German resources and to mobilize domestic resources on a sustainable basis, the German occupier also had to share the power, to a certain extent, with the home authorities.

In the horizontal axis, by contrast, in the relations of German actors among themselves, power rivalries developed of the kind that also marked the National Socialist system of rule in the Reich.

The multidimensional character of the division of power in the occupied territories of Western Europe granted the key players considerable leeway for action, which they sought, to different extents, to exploit for their own purposes and goals.

Even though these purposes and goals may have followed a general line as was undoubtedly the case with the persecution of the Jews , they were heterogeneous and volatile when it came to specifics.

These contradictions would have inevitably led to substantial problems in the occupation policy even if, in other respects, the German side had had clear strategic concepts for dealing with the occupied territories and unambiguous regulations regarding competences.

But there was no such clarity. This could not fail to lead to permanent incoherence in the occupation policy.

This was astonishing for contemporaries in the case of a regime that had the aura of a tightly run dictatorship and an effective administration.

What relative weights should be accorded to these goals and how these overall objectives should best be accomplished, however, remained objects of internal disputes.

The individual branches of power could mobilize the support of central Reich authorities or of leading representatives of the regime, including Hitler himself, on a case-by-case basis.

However, heterogeneous ideological fronts and interests developed here too, depending not least on the course of the war and hence on the German power potential in Europe.

A fundamental line of conflict was that between those who regarded collaboration with the German occupying power and those who regarded passive or active resistance as the appropriate strategy in the struggle to promote national interests.

Precisely analogous to relations on the German side, the collaborators included ideologues and pragmatists, depending on whether the individuals concerned believed they should cooperate with the Germans on ideological grounds or for reasons of expediency.

Under these conditions, a stable axis of cooperation was most likely to develop between the pragmatists on both sides. This cooperation was threatened by the incoherence of the occupation policy on the German side and, naturally, by the organized resistance on the side of the occupied countries.

Both factors were destined to destabilize the cooperative relations as the war persisted. In the occupied western territories, the expansion and intensification of the German war economy from the first half of onward23 led to an increased demand for labor and to more immediate interventions in the national economies concerned.

In addition, there was progressive deterioration of the military position of the Reich from the fall of onward.

These two factors reduced the willingness of the ideologically indifferent forces in the occupied countries to collaborate and strengthened the willingness of the opposition forces to engage in active resistance.

With this, there could be no real question of power-sharing relations, at least in the vertical axis. Like the rule of the National Socialist regime in the Reich proper, the final phase of the occupation was marked by a surge in coercion, violence, and terror in Western Europe.

The systematic execution of the anti-Jewish policy was initiated in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France in the fall of The sequence of persecution measures and related stages of radicalization until the spring of corresponded, in essence, to those in the Reich until the onset of the mass deportations in the fall of This development took a more or less homogeneous course in Western Europe.

However, there were profound differences in how the enforcing authorities were established, both in comparison to the Reich and among the three Western European countries.

These differences, in turn, had lasting repercussions for the actual enforcement of the persecution. Already in the Reich, the authorities charged with enforcing the persecution of the Jews were centralized in varying degrees.

The police side of the persecution was under the direction of the Reich Security Main Office and was implemented by the regional and local agencies of the Gestapo under its direct control.

The SS and police authorities strove to realize this centralization also in the occupied Western European countries, though they met with very uneven success there.

In the Netherlands, supreme police authority lay with the German general commissioner for security, who was simultaneously HSSPF and hence embodied the principle of the amalgamation of party organizations SS, SD and state police realized in the Reich Security Main Office and claimed the authority to issue directions to the Dutch police.

In Belgium, the police authority resided with the military commander, hence the Wehrmacht, until July In fact, one cannot assume that a linear relation existed between a more pronounced hierarchization of the occupation administration and a greater centrality of the SS and Gestapo in the occupation system, on the one hand, and the level of implementation of the intentions to persecute the Jews, on the other.

If the Reich Security Main Office succeeded in making the latter, through glaring deficiencies in domestic and military security and political stability, look incompetent in the eyes of the upper echelons of the regime if possible, of Hitler himself , it could hope for an increase in authority and power.

This tactic would succeed at least in the Netherlands and France. In the Netherlands, political strikes in February lead to a strengthening of the position of the SS and Gestapo apparatus as regards competences in the persecution of the Jews; in France, through attacks on Paris synagogues in October , the SS provoked heightened tensions that ultimately resulted in the appointment of an HSSPF in May In the area of the economic persecution of the Jews, the competences were already spread over different administrative areas in Germany proper.

The most important authorities, aside from the apparatus of the SS and Gestapo, were the so-called regional economic advisers Kreiswirtschaftsberater of the NSDAP, the financial administration and the plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan.

At this time, the efforts of the SS leadership to concentrate competences in both the police and the economic persecution of the Jews in Germany proper were focused primarily on the plundering of the Jews in connection with the emigration.

The regular occupation administrations did not allow their competences in the economic domain to be withdrawn, even where the Jews were concerned the plundering of the Jews by the Gestapo in the immediate context of the arrests and deportations remained unaffected by this, of course.

This reflected the primacy of the general occupation policy, whose overall objective focused on the economic exploitation of the occupied territories.

The extent to which tasks and hence also power were divided between the German and the home authorities in the domain of the economic persecution of the Jews varied even more than in that of the persecution through police repression.

As a French institution on Belgian territory, the latter was subject to the enemy assets administration and, as a result, enabled the occupier to exercise more direct control by comparison with the Brussels Trust.

In France, by contrast, jurisdiction for the persecution of the Jews in the economic area was entirely under French control.

This division corresponded to the directives given to the German negotiators by Hitler, who accorded priority over other occupation policy considerations to the enduring split in the alliance between France and England.

Of decisive importance in the case of a continuation of the war against England, according to Hitler, were the loyalty of the French colonies toward a mother country that had withdrawn from the war and, for this reason, the existence of a French government as a sovereign entity with its own territory.

As heads of the civilian administration, they were in charge of the entire administration in the civilian area, which amounted to an annexation.

After the Allied landing in North Africa on 8 November , the Wehrmacht took control of large areas of the Free Zone by 12 November The first military governor of Paris, which was occupied by German troops on 14 June , was General Alfred von Vollard-Bockelberg, followed from 30 June by General Alfred Streccius as head of the military administration.

Under the authority of the military commander were a command staff to lead the occupation troops and an administrative staff.

Typical of the practice of military posting, the leadership of the command staff was subject to greater fluctuation than that of the administrative staff.

Between and , the command staff was led by five successive high-level officers Auleb, Speidel, Kossmann, Linstow, and Krause , of whom the future supreme commander of the NATO troops in Europe, Hans Speidel, is the most important figure historically.

Bearer of the Gold Honor Party Badge Goldenes Parteiabzeichen , Schmid could count as the representative of the NSDAP in the military administration in Paris.

Both the German and the French sides maintained the legal fiction that the armistice of 22 June was itself not affected by the expansion of German and Italian military presence in southeastern France.

The map depicts, accordingly, both the demarcation line between the northern and the southern zones and the thinner line demarcating the expanded Italian occupation zone that existed between 11 November and 8 September , when the Italian armed forces surrendered to the Allies.

A reckless manhunt for the Jews in the previous Italian occupation zone followed when the Germans took control. Copyright Bundesarchiv.

The administrative staff was subdivided into the Administration Section and the Economics Section. From August to June , the Administration Section was led by Dr.

Franz Medicus, who assumed responsibility in September for the administrative group with the quartermaster general in the Army High Command and later coordinated the reporting of the deactivation staffs.

From September to August , the Administration Section was led by Dr. Wilhelm Gustav Ermert. Throughout the occupation, the Economics Section was under the direction of Dr.

Elmar Michel, who, as mentioned, headed the entire administrative staff in personal union from August onward. Group 1, General Affairs and De-jewification, of Subsection Wi I, under chief military administrative counselor Dr.

Kurt Blanke, played a central role in the economic measures against the Jews. Nestler estimates that the total number of people working for German bodies in France, exclusive of the occupying troops, was 80, Following this pattern, on the day Paris was captured, 14 June , the Reich foreign minister appointed the former collaborator of his Ribbentrop Bureau, Otto Abetz, as the plenipotentiary accredited to the military commander in Paris.

In fact, it played an active role in launching the persecution of the Jews and its ceaseless radicalization. The relevant embassy employees in this connection were embassy counselor Dr.

The foreign minister was initially Paul Baudouin, to be succeeded on 27 October by Laval, who was himself dismissed as vice president and foreign minister on 13 December In April , Laval returned to power with expanded competences.

The relative autonomy and capacity for political action of the home officials and the political and ideological upheaval in the country set the occupation, governmental, and administrative relations in France apart fundamentally from those in Belgium and the Netherlands.

This ideological orientation acquired its dynamic from the fact that it identified the supposed causes of the catastrophe of June It went along with the fear of foreign infiltration, whether because of an assumed dilution of French culture and identity or because of assumed threats to public security or adverse demographic developments.

On the other hand, the logic of exclusion, as precisely formulated by Duverger see n. This issue linkage prepared the ground for all of the measures against the Jews up to the deportations to the extermination camps.

Through the argumentative linkage with the public interest, the measures against the Jews could assume the character of justified measures that could be the taken for granted.

Here the common sense of the political and administrative elites of Vichy found its counterpart in that of the German military administration.

The discrimination and persecution measures were facilitated by this common sense. These measures had nothing in common with the extermination plans of the National Socialist government in Germany.

Nevertheless, its genocidal plans could connect seamlessly with such preparations. Through a pro-German stance in different variants, the French side hoped, in the long term, to ensure that the status of France would be respected in a postwar Europe dominated by Germany and, in the short term, to secure an improvement in some important areas of domestic policy, particularly a speeding up of the return of the prisoners of war, an easing of travel and trade between the occupied and free zones, and, not least, a strengthening of administrative autonomy, including that of the police.

On 11 November , Hitler observed, in his Directive No. The latter measure was contentious even on the German side, because of the negative repercussions on public opinion and the willingness to collaborate in France.

The efforts of Vichy officials to prove the seriousness of their collaboration efforts became even more intensive.

Moreover, the incident helped to ensure that Laval enjoyed an outstanding key position in relations between Germany and France after his return to power in April At the beginning of the German occupation of France, these consisted of just a single bureau of the Security Service Sicherheitsdienst, or SD that enjoyed nothing more than observer status, which was indicative of the initially relatively weak position of the Reich Security Main Office in the Western European territories.

The insignificant SD bureau in Paris took instructions from Brussels, where a special task force was established under the physician Dr. Max Thomas, in his capacity as representative of the chief of the Security Police and Security Service for Belgium and France,2 to whom the agencies in both Brussels and Paris reported.

Helmut Knochen, senior commander of the Security Police and the SD in France from Knochen was thus formally answerable to the representative of the commander of the Security Police and the SD Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, or BdS for France and Belgium, Thomas, who was officially based in both Brussels and Paris.

The general competence for all security and police affairs lay in the hands of the military commander. He arrived in Paris in September and reported directly to the head of Department IV B 4 in the Reich Security Main Office, Adolf Eichmann.

A conflict broke out between him and Knochen in the summer of , because Dannecker dealt directly with the French police stations and, when attempting to put some of them under pressure, paid no heed to the overall direction of occupation policy in the area of policing, which, meanwhile, was based on negotiated agreements between the German and French police leadership rather than on hierarchical order and obedience.

In the meantime, the preconditions for the collaboration were also favorable on the French side. Between June and August , Oberg, Knochen, and Bousquet conducted intensive negotiations aimed at achieving a compromise between collaboration in security matters and protecting French administrative autonomy.

Among the most horrifying episodes of the collaboration, however, was the deportation in August of several thousands of Jewish children, most of whom were separated from their parents and, after weekslong stopovers in French camps, were transported in cattle wagons to Auschwitz, where, without exception, they were murdered in the gas chambers immediately upon arrival.

The representatives of the Reich Security Main Office were involved only peripherally. Nevertheless, from the fall of at the latest, economic and repressive police persecution measures would be closely intermeshed.

In the measures to be taken against the Jews in the economic domain, two aspects are decisive. First, we must do what is necessary to ensure that the elimination of Jews [from the economy] endures even after the occupation.

Furthermore, the German side cannot provide sufficient manpower to deal with the great number of Jewish enterprises.

Both of these considerations have led us to involve the French authorities in the elimination of Jews.

This will ensure that the French authorities share the responsibility and that the French administrative apparatus can be employed.

Assuming that important German interests are not involved, therefore, French provisional administrators will also be used in the first instance.

In principle, the aim will be to replace the Jews by French so that the French population also benefits economically from the elimination of the Jews and to avoid the impression that only the Germans want to take the place of the Jews.

This approach involves the danger that lower-level officials will not perform the tasks assigned to them with the necessary zeal, out of a lack of conviction.

Therefore, the task of the German military administration authorities will be to supervise and monitor carefully the activity of the French authorities in this regard.

The right of the administrateurs provisoires to liquidate Jewish enterprises was explicitly confirmed by law on 2 February When it came to the midsize and larger enterprises, the German military administration headquarters in Paris was in charge.

The body was divided into eight sections, each devoted to a particular economic sector. In the first half of , at least the administrateurs provisoires for the midsize and larger enterprises were still selected and appointed either by the prefects or directly by the administration of the military commander.

In France, there could be no question of such a central authority under German direction, because of the guarantee of French administrative sovereignty in the Armistice Convention.

The CGQJ had two headquarters, one in Vichy and one in Paris. It was answerable to the interior minister from April to May , then directly to the head of government from May The CGQJ serves as an example both of the tensions and contradictions within the multidimensional division of powers in the interplay between the German occupying power and the Vichy regime and of the action orientations of those concerned.

The comparison with the conditions in Belgium, where the planned Commissariat royal aux questions juives did not come about,18 makes this obvious.

On the other hand, the CGQJ was nevertheless established under German pressure and, as such, was an indication of latent interference by the occupying power in French administrative affairs.

Finally, the assignment of competence to the CGQJ triggered rivalries with the already established authorities, particularly with the SCAP and the regular Vichy ministries.

Copyright Agence Roger Viollet. This was true of the newly created MPI. Bichelonne and Bousquet each had a German counterpart in the person of comparably young and unscrupulous Nazi functionaries.

In the area of the economy and the collaboration in mobilizing workforces for the German armaments industry, this counterpart was Albert Speer.

From the French perspective, the question arose again concerning the integrity of the national administrative structures.

From the German perspective, neither the occupied zone nor the Free Zone had a functioning administrative apparatus for implementing the economic measures against the Jews in the spring of By a law of 19 June , the SCAP was integrated into the CGQJ.

The remaining 10 percent was used to finance the CGQJ. Through a government ordinance of 21 March ,30 the UGIF was then authorized to draw upon the frozen accounts at the CDC to repay the credit.

In the final analysis, therefore, the so-called fine lent further impetus to the radicalization of the economic persecution measures directed against the Jews.

It ensured that the spoliation of Jewish property by the state was firmly institutionalized, particularly through the close cooperation between state authorities and banks.

In the final stage, these efforts of the French side ran parallel to the plans by the SD and the Gestapo to initiate the systematic mass deportations of Jews from France and to the streamlining of the organizational preconditions through the appointment of Oberg as HSSPF in May and the promotion of Knochen to BdS.

The primary issue for all of those concerned was instead a political one. On the German side in , the objective of the deportation of all Jews was a directive from the very highest level.

That was sufficient as motivation for the persecutors and as an argument toward the French authorities. Therefore, the prehistory of the mass deportations that began in June is, above all, proof of the political capabilities of the SS.

Both of these facts were primarily due to a Franco-German consensus among the professional police technocrats, epitomized by the Oberg-Bousquet agreement of August Their paths crossed after fundamental political changes as well as alterations affecting personnel and organization had been made on both the German and French sides in the spring of These involved, on the German side, the exclusion of the military commander from policing matters through the monopolization of jurisdiction by the SS and, on the French side, the return to power of Pierre Laval in April Initial French and German Persecution Measures The anti-Jewish measures introduced on both the French and German sides through ordinances and administrative decisions from the fall of onward represent the first arena.

At first, they did not lead to any more far-reaching organizational measures. Jewish immigrants or their children were profoundly affected by these measures.

The same holds for the Vichy law of 10 September ,11 which adopted an ordinance of the German commander in chief of the army of 20 May for the rear military areas under military administration,12 according to which a provisional administrator administrateur provisoire could be appointed for companies with absentee owners.

The first French measure directed explicitly against the Jews was the annulment on 27 August of the law of 21 April making anti-Semitic propaganda in the press a punishable offense.

Because of the first statute, Jews were excluded from the civil service and the army, from all public offices, from public companies, from teaching at public schools, and from a series of cultural and journalistic professions.

This was connected with a law published a few weeks later, on 22 July , mandating the handover and public administration of Jewish assets.

In the spring of , a further wave of economic decrees followed, subjecting the Jews to strict controls over their property that were implemented by the Vichy authorities.

The ordinances and administrative measures against the Jews primarily served to support strict police controls and restrictions on their mobility, but from May , direct repressive measures primarily targeted against nonFrench Jews were also taken.

Based on the law of 4 October , the French police imprisoned around 3, Jews in Paris on 14 May , deporting them to the Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande detention camps run by French authorities in the occupied zone.

On 20 August , the Paris metropolitan police conducted a large-scale raid, in the course of which 3, Jews, mostly non-French nationals, were arrested based on arrest lists26 and were confined in the Drancy internment camp.

To this must be added internees from the Drancy camp. They formed the first of 79 transports sent to the extermination camps to which around 77, Jews living in France would fall victim.

The first mass murder of Jewish deportees by gassing took place on 19 July , to which of the deportees from the seventh convoy from Drancy fell victim.

The German military administration as well as the Vichy authorities and their police were involved in these persecution measures from the outset.

Congruent objectives functioned as a radicalizing factor in this process as much as did the wrangling over competences.

During the first phase of the German occupation until the invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June , the government in Vichy pursued an independent and active anti-Semitic policy whose primary goal was the exclusion of the Jews from the economy and public life and from the civil service.

When, following the invasion of the Soviet Union, the occupiers declared communist resistance to be a new security risk, they could also count on the basic willingness of the French police to collaborate in this area.

If an extensive homogeneity of objectives and the collaboration based on a division of labor were already an essential radicalizing factor, the dynamic of escalation was aggravated still further by the competition over competences between the German military administration and the Vichy authorities.

This was made apparent from the outset by the economic persecution measures against the Jews,31 where the Vichy representatives were afraid that the Germans would exert direct influence over French economic life.

The same logic would become apparent, from the spring of onward, in the police repression of the Jews in advance of and during the deportations. They led to the development of procedural routines and the formation of new administrative bodies.

Although a consolidation in this respect was achieved in the area of the economic persecution of the Jews in the summer of , such a consolidation in the area of police repression would not be achieved until the summer of The prompt French initiative and the rapid construction of the SCAP were a result of the determination on the French side to prevent the economic persecution of the Jews from becoming a vehicle of German influence over the French economy.

The institutional relations were considerably more complicated in the area of the police repression of the Jews. This applied to both the German and the French sides and to the relations between the German and French authorities.

These efforts were not successful when it came to the economic measures against the Jews. The process began with repressive measures by the military administration following the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June This event ensured that clearly defined ideological fronts were restored on both the National Socialist and Communist sides.

On 19 August , a German field court-martial passed a death sentence on two young men, Henri Gautherot and Samuel Tyszelman, who had been arrested some days previously.

Both were immediately executed, and the execution was announced throughout the entire Paris municipal area, using particularly conspicuous red or yellow posters.

On the posters announcing the execution of the two young communists, the military administration made explicit that Tyszelman was a Jew.

On 21 August , a member of the German armed forces was attacked for the first time, presumably as a response to the execution of Gautherot and Tyszelman.

A German marine was shot dead by two French attackers in a Paris Metro station. The reaction of Vichy to this new escalation of the German policy of repression was telling.

As early as 23 August , the Vichy interior minister, Pierre Pucheu, passed a law authorizing special courts to impose particularly draconian punishments, including the death penalty, on communist and anarchist offenders.

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